Later, the collapse of Soviet Union in led to creation of many independently states, most important five central Asian states namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
Richard Weitz At the recent Russo-Chinese summit in Beijing, both governments again hailed their close ties, signed seventeen agreements on economic and other issues, and vowed to expand their joint military engagements. China pledged to invest more in the Russian Far East and buy more Russian nuclear energy technology.
It is hard to contest the regular assertions of Russian and Chinese leaders that relations between Beijing and Moscow are the best they have ever been. Although sunny assessments about current Sino-Russian ties are correct, such alignments are vulnerable to shifts in the underlying conditions that support them.
These and other plausible changes could at some point undermine the foundations of their current entente.
Interested third parties may or may not be able to shape these variables, but at least other governments need to understand the evolving dynamic of this important relationship and prepare for its future evolution. China consumes the resources directly, whereas Russian companies earn valuable revenue by reselling Central Asian hydrocarbons in third-party markets, especially in Europe.
Both countries know that certain regional events such as further political revolutions or civil wars could adversely affect core security interests.
Both governments especially fear ethnic separatism in their border territories supported by Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia.
Yet neither the president nor his challenger seem alert to, or prepared for, such a possibility. The shared regional security interests between Beijing and Moscow have meant that the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become a generally unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations.
Since its founding inthe SCO has essentially functioned as a Chinese-Russian condominium, providing Beijing and Moscow with a convenient multilateral framework to manage their interests in Central Asia. The bilateral defense relationship has evolved in recent years to become more institutionalized and better integrated.
As befits two large and powerful neighbors, the senior military leaders of China and Russia now meet frequently in various formats.
In addition, the two armed forces engage in many small and several large joint exercises, sometimes along with their Central Asian partners. The two governments coordinate their foreign policies in the United Nations, where they regularly block Western-backed efforts to impose sanctions on anti-Western regimes.
Their leaders share a commitment to a philosophy of state sovereignty non-interference and territorial integrity against separatism. Although they defend national sovereignty by appealing to international law, their opposition also reflects more pragmatic considerations—a shared desire to shield their human rights and civil liberties abuses, and those of their allies, from Western criticism.
With Vladimir Putin in office for a third presidential term, Sino-Russian relations will likely continue improving at a moderate clip. Putin clearly intends to maintain strong relations with Beijing.
The Russian government is particularly eager to secure Chinese investment to help modernize the Russian economy. In another article that appeared shortly before his June state visit to China, Putin laid out an ambitious agenda for future Russia-China cooperation, both bilaterally and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Yet the summit failed to produce the long-awaited natural gas deal between the two countries due to sharp differences over the price China should pay for Russian gas.
Even their earlier oil deal, which began delivering Russian oil to the PRC by direct pipeline inhas now become engulfed in litigation and Chinese demands for lower prices. At the societal level, culturally embedded negative stereotypes about the other nationality persist in both counties.
Their political and commercial elites send their children to schools in Europe and the United States rather than to Beijing and Moscow.
Russians in turn complain about Chinese pollution spilling into Russian territory and worry that large-scale Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East will result in large swaths of eastern Russia becoming de facto parts of China.
The economic agenda of the summit, dominated by the Chinese proposal for an SCO development bank, stalled in the face of Russian opposition, as have earlier PRC proposals to establish an SCO-wide free trade zone. His Eurasian Union initiative would exclude China from the former Soviet space and erect trade barriers between China and Central Asia.
In East Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, the governments of China and Russia have followed parallel but typically uncoordinated policies. Neither country is the main economic partner of the other. Russians still look to the Europeans, especially Germany, as their standard, while viewing the other former Soviet republics as their main source of imported raw materials.
They also will find it hard to address the imbalances in their existing two-way exchanges. China mostly buys Russian raw materials while selling Russians value-added consumer and industrial goods, sometimes made from Russian materials. Russians worry about becoming a natural-resource appendage of the Chinese economic power plant and complain that PRC investors avoid the Russian market in favor of easier opportunities in other countries.Russia interest in Central Asia Essay.
Russia interest in Central Asia. At the beginning of the 17th century Russia and China made their way into central china - Russia interest in Central Asia Essay introduction.
Russian wanted to build a buffer zone moving from the east expanding to . Energy resources are key to this growing relationship as the geographic region comprising the former Soviet Central Asian Republics increasingly becomes a strategic global energy supplier.
1 There are a number of outside economic and political players interested in the Sino-Central Asian border and vying for interest in this region.
The increase in global energy demand that accompanies the eventual easing of economic recession will intensify competition for oil and gas from the Central Asia and Caucasus region.
In the review’s intro, BP CEO Bob Dudley writes, “Global energy markets are in transition.” He points to Asia a major arena of growth, rather than “traditional markets” in the OECD.
So the funding for the more assertive, more powerful policy comes from exporting energy resources," he said. At the same time, the abundance of oil and gas reserves in the region has led to increased focus on the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus by the United States, Europe, China, and India.
The shared regional security interests between Beijing and Moscow have meant that the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become a generally unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations.